T.J. Watt saves the afternoon. The offense converts 3 of 13 third downs. Pittsburgh wins 20–13 in a game that spends most of the fourth quarter feeling like it could still go sideways. If your first reaction was that you have been watching this exact game since 2021, nobody is going to argue you out of it. Mike McCarthy replaced Mike Tomlin. Aaron Rodgers is under center. The Steelers still needed their best defensive player to supply the decisive points thatt closed the game before the offense could do the job itself.
But there is a difference between recognizing the finish and evaluating everything that happened before it. Where Rodgers targeted the ball. How McCarthy designed the formations, Patrick Graham deployed his edge rushers and how Pat Freiermuth fit into a passing game that, for years, had no real place for him. Those details deserve a closer look, not because the Steelers are already fixed, but because some of what they are doing about their problems has genuinely changed.
The Numbers You Cannot Ignore First
Before anything else, the uncomfortable facts need to be on the table. Pittsburgh produced 264 total yards. The offense scored one touchdown. The Steelers went 0-for-2 on fourth-down attempts. Atlanta’s kicker missed three field goals, which helped Pittsburgh more than McCarthy’s offense did.
The opponent also matters here. Atlanta started Cooper Rush — their third-string quarterback. Rush finished 12-for-22, 143 yards, one touchdown, and two interceptions. Holding that passing offense in check is a real accomplishment. It is not a template for what is coming over the next 16 weeks. Those caveats belong at the top, not buried in a footnote. The reason for optimism is specific and limited. It is also real.
Rodgers Was Throwing Much Deeper. The Metrics Confirm It.
The most important change from Week 1 does not appear in the final yardage. It shows up in where Rodgers was trying to put the ball. Rodgers posted an average depth of target of 10.1 yards against Atlanta, his highest single-game mark from the entire 2025 season. His full-season average depth of target in 2025 was 6.0 yards. That is nearly 70% deeper, in one game, under a new head coach with a different philosophy.
His average intended air yards climbed to 9.5, ranking 11th among Week 1 starters per Next Gen Stats. His time to throw increased from a league-leading 2.52 seconds in 2025 to 2.95 seconds. He held the ball longer because he was looking farther downfield. The profile changed. The intermediate passing range is where the scheme produced most clearly. On attempts between 10 and 19 yards, Rodgers went 5-for-7 for 87 yards and his only passing touchdown. That 17.5% intermediate attempt rate was up from 14.3% across all of 2025.
However, the counterpoint cannot be softened. Rodgers was 0-for-6 on attempts of 20 yards or more. The vertical aggression was documented. The vertical execution was not there. Intended air yards and completed air yards are different metrics. Do not treat them as interchangeable. The scheme pointed deeper. The production did not match the ambition. Both things are true.
Passing volume in context: Rodgers attempted 40 passes in the opener. His first 40-plus attempt game of the 2025 season came in Week 16, December 21 against Detroit. Under McCarthy, he reached that total in the first game of the year.
Pat Freiermuth Is a Feature, Not a Footnote
This is the piece of the offense that fans should pay attention to and it may be the most underreported development of the week. Pat Freiermuth caught five passes for 46 yards and the Steelers’ only offensive touchdown. He was not operating as a safety valve or a short-yardage option. He was a central piece of the intermediate passing game. Great to see after Freiermuth couldn’t find his place in the offense last year. His involvement was not isolated. Michael Pittman Jr. added 3 catches for 58 yards, the most efficient receiving day on the roster. Together, both players showed the interior of the field was genuinely open.
DK Metcalf presented the other side. He finished 4-for-10 on targets for 40 yards, dropping a third-down pass and missing a deep opportunity over the middle in the second half. The interior opportunities existed. Freiermuth proved it. Metcalf’s misses illustrated what Pittsburgh left on the field. One honest caveat: no full directional passing chart exists for this game. The Metcalf drop is a documented example, not confirmed evidence of a league-wide statistical shift toward interior targets. Use it as what it is.
McCarthy Changed the Pre-Snap Picture
The formation decisions before the snap were as meaningful as the throws that followed. McCarthy deployed three- and four-wide looks throughout the game, with backs and tight ends split wide rather than anchored in the backfield per USA Today’s schematic recap. Jaylen Warren and Rico Dowdle combined for 26.8% of the team’s targets. Neither back was sitting in protection. Both were active parts of the route structure.
That changes what a defense must account for before the snap. A linebacker who has to cover a running back near the boundary cannot simultaneously fit the run and stay in zone coverage. A safety who respects the release has to balance his depth responsibilities. Rodgers reads those decisions in real time and he remains one of the few quarterbacks in the league whose pre-snap processing is more dangerous than most players’ post-snap adjustments.
Alright... Aaron Rodgers was balling with some of these throws.
— Tommy Jaggi (@TommyJaggi) September 14, 2026
DK Metcalf left some explosive plays on the table, and there was an opportunity for maybe another 150 yards. #Steelers pic.twitter.com/i5Ix8E2AyK
Great decision yesterday by Steelers DC Patrick Graham to match ATL’s 12-personnel with a 2-5-4 package that used Nick Herbig in place of a nickel defender. It gave PIT better run support, and with Graham playing almost exclusively zone schemes, didn’t expose Herbig in coverage. pic.twitter.com/zKEsC1lm28
— Kevin Smith (@KTSmithFootball) September 14, 2026
The Defense Ran Four Edge Rushers. That Is New.
As we provided a Patrick Graham defensive preview outlined before the season, the entire premise of this scheme was that Pittsburgh would stop designing a defense that needed Watt to win every one-on-one and start building one that manufactured his matchups. Week 1 was the first real test of that premise.
Per The Athletic’s Week 1 strategy breakdown, snap counts were distributed deliberately: Watt at 37, Highsmith at 40, Herbig at 37, and Jack Sawyer at 21. All four contributed in meaningful roles. That rotation has not existed in Pittsburgh in recent years. Graham also blitzed only once in the entire game, dropping seven or eight defenders into coverage instead. His front four still generated four sacks without additional pressure packages. He said after the game: “We’ll blitz. I promise.” signaling the Week 1 approach was deliberate, not default.
Coverage-wise, Pittsburgh ran Cover 3 at 43.9%, Quarters at 29.8%, and Cover 6 at 22.8% — a zone-heavy system replacing the man-coverage scheme that defined Pittsburgh’s last five seasons.
Bijan Robinson Was a Problem. Just Not the One You Think.
Bijan Robinson finished with 173 scrimmage yards which accounted for Atlanta’s 238 total yards. He was essentially their entire offense. But the specific problem is not what the total makes it look like. His rushing line: 21 carries, 83 yards. That is under four yards per carry. Manageable, not a collapse. His receiving line: 8 catches on 10 targets for 90 yards and a touchdown. That is where the real exposure lived.
Run defense and coverage against a receiving back require different skills entirely. Stopping the run means gap integrity, linemen holding blocks, and linebackers filling downhill without overrunning plays. Matching a back releasing into the route tree requires pre-snap recognition, staying in phase through the route, and finishing the tackle in space after the catch. Pittsburgh managed the first task reasonably well. The second task produced 90 yards and a score.
Without published coverage charting, assigning Robinson’s receiving production to a specific defender is neither accurate nor fair. However, the pattern is clear: when Robinson released into Graham’s zone system, Pittsburgh’s coverage was exposed in ways the run-defense numbers do not capture. Cooper Rush did not make that look easy on purpose. A better quarterback will ask the same question with more intent and more precision. That answer needs to be better before Week 8.
Different Is a Starting Point. Better Still Has to Show Up.
Nobody owes an apology for thinking Sunday felt familiar. The Steelers needed T.J. Watt to rescue a game the offense had real chances to close. Third-down efficiency was poor. Deep-ball execution did not follow the vertical intent. Those problems are real, and they do not disappear because the sideline looks different.
But the case for measured optimism is also specific. Rodgers targeted the ball nearly 70% deeper than his 2025 season average. McCarthy spread the formation and built plays that attacked the intermediate field. Freiermuth was a genuine offensive focal point, not an afterthought. Graham rotated four edge rushers and generated four sacks without relying on a blitz.
The Steelers have not proved they are better. They have shown they are attempting something different. That distinction matters, because one of those things is a product and the other is a process.
What to Watch for in Week 2:
- Whether the deeper target profile holds without Cooper Rush helping it along
- Whether Freiermuth’s intermediate role stays central to the game plan
- Whether middle-of-field opportunities convert instead of stall
- Whether the four-man edge rotation continues as a design choice
- Whether receiving backs find the same space against Pittsburgh’s zone assignments
The Steelers have not fixed anything yet. They have given fans a reason to look more closely before deciding this is exactly the same team. That is not a small thing. It is also not enough.
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